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Macroeconomists continue to search for an understanding of the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. The defining characteristic of this 
period is the wholesale collapse of virtually every aspect of the econ 
omy. Over the four years beginning in the summer of 1929, financial 
markets and institutions, labor markets, and international currency and 
goods markets all virtually ceased to function. Throughout this, the 
government policymaking apparatus seemed helpless. The complexity 
and magnitude of the economic catastrophe during this period make it 
extremely difficult to fashion a comprehensive explanation.
Over the nearly 65 years since the cyclical trough in March 1933, 
researchers have churned out volumes of work analyzing the 43-month 
contraction. EconLit, the CD-ROM index compiled by the Journal of 
Economic Literature, lists over 400 articles on the Great Depression 
that have appeared since 1969 alone. Where has all of this work gotten 
us? What have we learned over the past quarter century that can help 
us as we go forward?
One of the things we know is that our economic institutions are 
very different today than they were in 1929. Many of the changes are 
surely the result of the Depression itself. A few of the more important 
things that clearly came out of this period are that the Federal Reserve 
System is more centralized, we have deposit insurance and stronger 
bank regulation, commercial and investment banking are separated (at 
least for now), we have a pure paper money standard, and we have 
unemployment insurance and social security.
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Have these changes worked in helping us to avert the onset of 
another Great Depression? Clearly, the past 50 years have been charac 
terized by a substantially more stable economic environment. Since 
1945, the longest recession, from November 1973 to March 1975, 
lasted a mere 16 months—just over one-third the length of the Great 
Depression. The largest sustained drop in output has been a 2.1 per 
cent change in the early 1980s, compared with the decline of nearly 30 
percent in the early 1930s. While consumer prices fell 28 percent from 
August 1929 to April 1933, in no year since 1949 has the Consumer 
Price Index shown a decline. In December of 1982, the civilian unem 
ployment rate hit its post-World War II peak of 10.8 percent, while the 
estimate of the 1933 peak exceeds 25 percent!
Financial markets and institutions have fared equally well in the 
stable environment of the post-World War II economy. From its peak 
in mid September of 1929 to its trough in late June 1932, a broad index 
of large company stocks (equivalent to the Standard & Poor's 500) fell 
by 86 percent. By comparison, the largest sustained drop in the past 50 
years is the decline of 52 percent from mid January 1973 to early Octo 
ber 1974.
The total collapse of the financial intermediation system was evi 
denced by the fact that from the beginning of 1930 to the bank holiday 
of 1933, there were an astounding 9,096 commercial bank suspen 
sions! The number of suspensions in 1930 alone—1,350—was more 
than double the 659 in 1929. By contrast, in the 60 years since 1934 
there has been a total of just over 2,000 bank closings.
International goods markets broke down as well. From 1929 to 
1932, exports fell from 6.8 percent to 4.5 percent of gross output. In 
the 50 years since the end of World War II, exports of goods and ser 
vices have grown from 3.5 percent of gross national product to nearly 
12 percent.
International financial markets suffered as well during the Great 
Depression, with the gradual breakdown of the fixed exchange rate sys 
tem administered through the gold-exchange standard. Slowly, over the 
decade of the 1930s, all of the countries that followed the recon 
structed, post-World War I gold standard left it. The desire to have a 
fixed exchange rate system has obviously been very strong, as this was 
followed by the Bretton Woods System and then the European Mone 
tary System.
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Analyzing all of these events in any detail is clearly too big a task 
to undertake in one short essay. Instead, my goal is to point out what I 
think are the highlights. My presentation is split into four basic sec 
tions. Each begins with what I believe to be one of the major fallacies 
contained in the literature on the Great Depression. My purpose is to 
examine each of these fallacies to see what lessons we can learn. I 
come away with three important lessons that have become my own per 
sonal guide to policy analysis.
The four fallacies are as follows:
1. The Great Depression was caused by the stock market crash of 
1929.
2.. The banking system of the 1920s was fundamentally unsound.
3. The fact that nominal interest rates were approaching zero 
meant that Federal Reserve policy was loose and ineffective.
4. Tariff wars were primarily responsible for the spread and depth 
of the Depression.
I will argue that from analysis of these fallacies come the following 
lessons for current policy:
1. The central bank's function as the lender of last resort is of pri 
mary importance in the short-term stabilization of the financial 
system.
2. Deflation is extremely costly.
3. A gold standard is very dangerous.
Finally, I will comment on remaining mysteries. There are two 
important aspects of the Depression that we still do not fully under 
stand. First, why was it so long? Second, what is the comprehensive 
explanation for the entire inter-war period?
THE STOCK MARKET CRASH OF 1929
The crash of October 1929 has played a large role in the lore of the 
Great Depression. Over time, however, a number of issues have
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become clear, and we now understand the likely causes of the crash, as 
well as its likely consequences.
Let me begin with myths about the causes. In Cecchetti (1992b), I 
argue that there is little evidence for the three most commonly 
accepted reasons that asset prices fell so precipitously: 1) the bursting 
of a speculative bubble; 2) massive fraud and illegal activity; and 3) 
margin buying. Regarding the first, I note that, as Dominguez, Fair, 
and Shapiro (1988) demonstrate, contemporary data did not reveal any 
trends that suggested the drastic downturn that followed. Further 
more, it is easy to find statements from contemporary analysts sup 
porting the position that the market would rise and statements 
supporting the opposite position that the market would fall. In other 
words, economic fundamentals were also sound in late 1929.
There are numerous anecdotes that leave one feeling that fraud and 
illegal activity are an important explanation. 1 But Bierman (1991) has 
carefully examined the evidence and shows that there was probably 
very little actual insider trading or illegal manipulation. Instead, a 
number of lucky and unlucky investors were pilloried for perfectly 
legal actions.
The best evidence we have is that the crash was caused by Federal 
Reserve behavior, together with the public statements of numerous 
government officials. It has been amply documented, initially by 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and more recently by Hamilton (1987) 
and others, that Federal Reserve policy became substantially tighter in 
the fall of 1928, almost immediately following the death of Benjamin 
Strong, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. While 
he was alive, Strong controlled Federal Reserve policy, as the Federal 
Reserve Board was not as powerful as it is today. But when Strong 
died, Adolph Miller of the Federal Reserve Board was able to take con 
trol of policy. Miller believed that speculation was causing share 
prices to be too high and that this was damaging the economy. 
Together with Herbert Hoover, who had just been elected President, he 
set out to bring down stock market prices.
In its attempt to bring equity prices down, the Federal Reserve 
sought to keep banks from extending loans that would be used to buy 
stock. To this end, the February 1929 Federal Reserve Bulletin con 
tained the following policy statement, taken from a February 2, 1929, 
letter sent to Federal Reserve banks.
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During the last year or more,... the functioning of the Federal 
reserve system has encountered interference by reason of the 
excessive amount of the country's credit absorbed in specula 
tive security loans. The credit situation since the opening of 
the new year indicates that some of the factors which occa 
sioned untoward developments during the year 1928 are still at 
work. The volume of speculative credits is still growing . . .
The extraordinary absorption of funds in speculative security 
loans, which has characterized the credit movement during the 
past year or more, in the judgment of the Federal Reserve 
Board, deserves particular attention lest it become a decisive 
factor working toward a still further firming of money rates to 
the prejudice of the country's commercial interests . . .
The Federal Reserve Act does not, in the opinion of the Federal 
Reserve Board, contemplate the use of the resources of the 
Federal reserve banks for the creation or extension of specula 
tive credit. A member bank is not within its reasonable claims 
for rediscount facilities at its Federal reserve bank when it bor 
rows either for the purpose of making speculative loans or for 
the purpose of maintaining speculative loans.
The board has no disposition to assume authority to interfere 
with the loan practices of member banks so long as they do not 
involve the Federal reserve banks. It has, however, a grave 
responsibility whenever there is evidence that member banks 
are maintaining speculative security loans with the aid of Fed 
eral reserve credit. When such is the case the Federal reserve 
bank becomes either a contributing or a sustaining factor in the 
current volume of speculative security credit. This is not in 
harmony with the intent of the Federal Reserve Act, nor is it 
conducive to the wholesome operation of the banking and 
credit system of the country. (Board of Governors of the Fed 
eral Reserve System 1929, pp. 93-94)
(It is worth noting that the term "speculation" appears to have been 
common usage for share purchases that were made with borrowed 
money.)
I will simply note that this passage suggests the central bankers did 
not understand the difference between transactions that represent port 
folio reallocations and those that use real resources. An example will 
help to make the point. Consider a case in which a person holding an
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equity share wishes to sell it and purchase a bond. Another person 
wishes to purchase the share and incur debt (issue a bond). For sim 
plicity, say that the seller is willing to accept the bond issued by the 
buyer in payment. Such a transaction is essentially a risk trade and 
results in a net increase in the gross quantity of debt outstanding with 
no change in the level of equity or anyone's net worth. The portfolios 
of the two people do change as one individual goes from holding 
equity to holding debt, and the other goes from having no assets ;arid 
liabilities to having an equity asset and a bond liability.
The passage from the Federal Reserve Bulletin clearly shows that 
the Federal Reserve Board thought the increase in debt somehow used 
real resources and reduced the level of real investment. While confu 
sion between real and financial investment is common in the popular 
press, we can rightly expect more from those people who are in charge 
of policymaking.
It is no surprise that following the Federal Reserve Board's pro 
nouncement, the interest rate charged on broker loans rose dramati 
cally. In fact, this action very nearly generated a crash on March 26, 
1929. On that day, call money rates opened at 12 percent and rose to 
20 percent by noon. Meanwhile, stock prices fell by nearly 10 percent. 
But action by both the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the First 
National Bank to provide liquidity to the market in the form of broker 
loans stemmed the decline, and prices recovered almost entirely by the 
close of the day. Both Charles E. Mitchell, President of First National 
Bank, and George Harrison, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, were later criticized for taking these actions. In many ways, 
these attempts at expansion of liquidity and the associated criticisms 
were a precursor of things to come.
Even after the near crash in March, Federal Reserve policy contin 
ued to stifle the market by restricting the ability of member banks to 
make broker loans. This policy of "direct action," whereby the Federal 
Reserve openly discouraged lending collaterized by stock, did have the 
effect of stemming the increase in broker loans that originated from 
banks. In fact, broker loans from New York banks fell between March 
and May of 1929.
A second important contributor to the crash was likely to have 
been the repeated statements by public officials that stock prices were 
too high. The main culprit here is President Herbert Hoover, whose
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public comments supported Adolph Miller's attack on speculation. 
(See, for example, Hoover 1952, p. 172.)
We do not know why the market crashed exactly when it did. But 
it is clear that the actions of the Federal Reserve were very different in 
October than they were in March. After many months of warning, 
banks were not willing to extend broker loans to stem the decline, and 
the Federal Reserve had no desire to provide the liquidity that would 
have been necessary for the banks to do so. As a result, once the mar 
ket became disorderly and prices began to plummet, matters simply 
became worse.
This story suggests that the Federal Reserve could have stopped 
the stock market from crashing. The reason it did not is that Adolph 
Miller and his colleagues believed that credit extended to brokers for 
loans to purchase securities was, in some sense, credit that was 
unavailable to the commercial sector, and so raised interest rates and 
harmed business activity generally. This position is very difficult to 
justify, particularly since Federal Reserve accommodation could have 
simply increased total credit outstanding in order to keep interest rates 
on commercial loans at a level that was considered desirable. Further 
more, there is evidence that Benjamin Strong understood in 1928 that 
the solution to high interest rates was looser policy, not artificial 
attempts to reduce broker loans.
The consequences of the crash are more difficult to ascertain. The 
explanations just cited follow Friedman and Schwartz in viewing the 
crash as a by-product of the tight Federal Reserve policy and in ignor 
ing any direct effect of the crash on economic activity. But there are at 
least four ways in which the stock market decline could have influ 
enced consumer spending and therefore output. First, the crash could 
have depressed consumer spending by leading people to believe that 
the Depression was coming. The work of Dominguez, Fair, and Sha- 
piro (1988) suggests that this is unlikely. Second, the market crash 
reduced wealth, and this could have reduced consumer spending. But 
this is unlikely to have had a large effect, given that the stock market 
throughout 1929 remained above its level at the beginning of 1928. 
Third, Mishkin (1978) argues that the crash, together with recently 
accumulated consumer debt, served to make households illiquid. He 
then estimates that roughly two-thirds of the fall in spending can be 
accounted for by the deterioration of household balance sheets.
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Finally, Romer (1990) argues that the stock market crash created 
immediate income uncertainty, resulting in a decline in the purchase of 
consumer durables, for which she provides substantial empirical sup 
port. Specifically, Romer shows that there was a dramatic decline in 
new automobile registrations and department store sales immediately 
in November 1929. Mail-order sales began to fall in January 1930. 
This evidence suggests that some of the blame for the contraction can 
be traced directly to the stock market crash of 1929 and substantiates 
certain aspects of Temin's (1976) original hypothesis that the initial 
contraction in output in 1929 resulted from a collapse of consumption 
expenditure. Romer's position is bolstered by evidence in Cecchetti 
and Karras (1994), who find that there was a very large aggregate 
demand shock of nonmonetary origin in November 1929 that is largely 
responsible for the downturn of 1930.
There are two important lessons to be taken away from this experi 
ence. Both concern the behavior of central bankers. First, I believe 
that if central bankers allow the fluctuations in asset market prices to 
affect their decisions it may distract them from concentrating on some 
combination of output growth and inflation. The focus of the Federal 
Reserve on the level of equity prices in 1929 clearly led to a disas 
trously contractionary path for policy.
Second, the central bank can operate effectively as a lender of last 
resort only if it stands ready to provide immediate liquidity to any bank 
that presents assets meeting certain predetermined criteria. That is to 
say, if the financial system comes under stress—as it surely will during 
a sudden downturn in equity prices—the Federal Reserve must stand 
ready to supply reserves to the banking system. Again, the evidence 
suggests that, in October 1929, the Federal Reserve's actions served to 
exacerbate the problems caused by the crash.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF SOUND FINANCIAL 
INTERMEDIARIES
The Financial Crises of the 1930s
The failure of the system of financial intermediation, which culmi 
nated in the bank holiday of 1933, strongly suggests that there was 
something inherently wrong with the organization of the banking sys 
tem prior to the Depression. Why did the banking system collapse? 
Was the net worth of banks too low? There is a simple prima facie 
case that we can make against such a suggestion. First, there is the fact 
that banks entered the Depression with what, by modern standards, 
were very high amounts of equity. Book-value bank balance sheets 
indicate bank capital was 14 percent of assets at the end of 1929. By 
1940, it had fallen to 9 percent. While it has risen to over 7 percent 
recently, capital was less than 6 percent of assets for most of the 1980s.
But these are accounting numbers, and they may not be representa 
tive of the true economic condition of banks. If we had been able to 
compute the market value of bank assets, would they have been less 
than the value of bank liabilities? As has been emphasized in the bank 
ing literature, banks are maturity transformers. They take short-term 
liabilities and turn them into long-term assets. Since these assets are 
often not marketable, there is substantial risk involved in such a transi 
tion. The main risk comes from nominal interest rate movements. As 
nominal interest rates rise, the revenue stream from banks' long-term 
assets may be insufficient to service the obligations created by their 
short-term liabilities.
Were nominal interest rates rising during this period? The answer, 
which we can obtain from Cecchetti (1988b), is clearly no. The data in 
Figure 1 and Table 1 clearly show that nominal interest rates fell 
throughout the Depression. Three-month U.S. government rates fell 
from just over 5 percent in the spring of 1929 to less than one-half of 1 
percent by July 1931. While they went up significantly for a few 
months in late 1931, around the time when Britain left the gold stan 
dard, they quickly returned to very low levels and remained there until 
after World War II. Long-term interest rates followed a similar pattern, 
falling through most of 1929, 1930, and most of 1931.
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Figure 1 Monthly Nominal Interest Rates, 3-Month and 5-Year Yields, 
1929 to 1940
1 254 5 6 ___ ______
M
\A \ 
\ ' V \
1929 1931 1933 1935 1937 1939 1941
Table 1 Chronology of Monetary Events during the Depression
1 - October 1929 Stock Market Crash
2 - October 1930 First Banking Crisis
3 - March 1931 Second Banking Crisis
4 - September 1931 Britain Leaves the Gold Standard
5 - January 1933 Last Banking Crisis
6 - March 1933 Bank Holiday 
Numbers correspond to vertical lines in the figures.
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An alternative explanation for the banking system collapse is the 
debt-deflation hypothesis. First advanced in Irving Fisher's (1933) 
paper, and more recently formalized by Ben Bernanke and Mark 
Gertler (1989, 1990), the theory is that the 30 percent cumulative defla 
tion of 1930-1932 was primarily responsible for the depth of the 
Depression. The argument proceeds as follows. Since unanticipated 
deflation increases the real burden of nominal debt, it caused debtors to 
default on loans, which led to bank failures and the collapse of the 
financial system. Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990) examine a formal 
model in which deflation lowers borrower net worth, thereby increas 
ing leverage and the desire of entrepreneurs to take on risk. This raises 
the probability of bankruptcy, lowers the level of investment, and 
causes a reduction in both aggregate supply and aggregate demand.
Once again, the problem can be traced to behavior of the Federal 
Reserve. Without the deflation, the financial system would not have 
disintegrated. Since the deflation is clearly a monetary phenomenon, 
we have found the villain.
Unfortunately, we should not stop here. We must look further, as 
the banking system crashed in a series of systemic panics. These 
waves were surely unnecessary. Their defining characteristic was that 
solvent banks were forced into bankruptcy as depositors demanded 
convertibility of their deposits into currency, and all the banks had 
were nonmarketable assets.
Was there a policy failure here as well? The consensus is that there 
was. The job of the lender of last resort is to step in at exactly these 
times. Why was the Federal Reserve so reticent to engage in making 
discount loans during this period? Figure 2 shows the path of discount 
loans during the inter-war period. The most striking feature of this fig 
ure is that during the 1920-1922 deflation, Federal Reserve lending 
increased substantially, hitting its peak just prior to the trough of the 
business cycle. 2 This is in stark contrast to the pattern during the initial 
phases of the Depression. Beginning with the crash and ending in late 
1931, well after the second banking crisis, the level of borrowings fell 
and stayed at a very low level.
Data on bank suspensions show that from 1930 to 1932 an average 
of 1,699 banks, representing an average of over $1 billion in deposits, 
suspended operation each year. Assuming that the volume of loan 
defaults is roughly proportional to the level of suspended deposits, one
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can infer that as banks were becoming illiquid in 1930, Fed lending 
was declining.
In light of the deterioration of bank assets during the early 1930s, it 
seems extremely unlikely that the decline in borrowing from the Fed 
resulted solely from demand-side factors. 3 Instead, it seems plausible 
that the Fed played some role. The Fed's failure to actively encourage 
borrowing to meet the short-run liquidity demands of depositors 
should not be overlooked. In essence, the Fed failed to perform as the 
lender of last resort. Without an ultimate source of short-run cash, 
banks were forced to suspend operation. If, on the other hand, the Fed 
had actively sought to discount bank assets, the bank panics could have 
been averted, and the deflation would not have been as prolonged.
Institutional Responses
The solutions offered during the 1930s had three major compo 
nents. They were the provision of added information to potential
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investors, the creation of deposit insurance, and the fragmentation of 
the financial system. The last of these has now largely been undone. 
The first has been, and I hope will continue to be, emphasized. But, 
what should we make of deposit insurance? The purpose of deposit 
insurance is to eliminate systemic bank runs. Surely, it has worked.
But deposit insurance creates incentive problems for banks, since 
depositors do not have any interest at all in the quality of bank assets. 
Bankers are, in essence, able to gamble with government-guaranteed 
funds. This leads to powerful arguments against deposit insurance. 
The alternative, implicitly advocated by some critics, is that the lender 
of last resort will function to keep solvent banks from folding and 
allow insolvent ones to close. The problem with such a strategy is that 
it requires that the lender of last resort be quick and nimble in its reac 
tions. My sense is that we are better off relying on imperfect institu 
tions that offer automatic responses than on central bankers, who may 
not realize what is needed.
UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS OF DEFLATION
Past discussions of the Depression have at times been muddled by 
the fact that nominal interest rates were extremely low during the entire 
period. Once the three-month U.S. Treasury bill rate fell below 3 per 
cent in 1930, it did not rise back to this level until after World War II. In 
fact, as Figure 1 shows, by modern standards the nominal interest rate 
was remarkably low over the entire period from 1929 to 1940.
This fact caused a particularly simple type of confusion. It was 
thought by some that since nominal interest rates were low, Federal 
Reserve policy must not be contractionary, and so it could not be respon 
sible for the Depression. How, people thought, could monetary expan 
sion have been efficacious in this circumstance, when the nominal 
interest rate was already so low? This argument led to theories of a so- 
called liquidity trap—the notion that there is some point at which further 
changes in the quantity of money have no impact on the interest rate.
This line of reasoning confuses nominal and real interest rates. 
During the early 1930s, there was a tremendous deflation. Over a 
three-year period, consumer prices fell by nearly 30 percent. Figure 3
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Figure 3 Monthly Changes in Consumer Price Inflation, 1919 to 1940
1921 1923 1925 1927 1929 1931 1933 1935 1937 1939 1941
shows the pattern of inflation for the entire inter-war period. The main 
point to note is that there were two large deflations. In addition to the 
1930s, there was the 1920-1922 deflation in which consumer prices 
fell by approximately 18 percent.
When people expect prices to keep falling, ex ante real interest 
rates will be very high. To see exactly how high they might have been 
during the Depression, in Cecchetti (1992b) I estimated real interest 
rates for three-month loans. The results are reported in Figure 4. The 
most important thing to realize is that the real interest rate during the 
entire Depression period was extremely high—the peak in early 1932 
exceeded 20 percent! This is high by any standard. At no point since 
the end of the Depression have real interest rates exceeded even 10 per 
cent. So, while nominal interest rates were low, real interest rates were 
very, very high.
The clear cause of these high real interest rates was extraordinarily 
tight policy. As was first emphasized by Friedman and Schwartz
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Figure 4 Ex ante Real Interest Rate, 1919 to 1940
(monthly at an annual rate, 3-month horizon)
1 23 4 56
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(1963) and has been observed by many others since, the monetary 
aggregates were shrinking quickly over this period. For example, Ml 
went from a high of $26.7 million at the August 1929 cyclical peak to 
$19.5 million at the April 1933 cyclical trough, a drop of 27 percent. 
M2 followed the same pattern, declining by one-third over the same 
nearly four-year period. The Federal Reserve's confusion, of course, 
came from the fact that this was all going on at the same time that they 
were actively expanding the monetary base. Clearly, policymakers did 
not take account of declines in the money multiplier—the ratio of 
broad measures of money such as M2 to the monetary base—when 
they were evaluating their policy stance.
Once again, the debt-deflation hypothesis is the widely accepted 
explanation for how central bank policy created such a disaster. But 
the theory requires that deflation be unanticipated. There is some 
debate over whether the deflation was actually unanticipated (see 
Cecchetti 1992a; Hamilton 1992; Nelson 1991). If not, then theories
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that rely on high ex ante real interest rates, and the resulting collapse 
of consumption and investment, might be more relevant than the debt- 
deflation hypothesis.4
A complementary explanation is that temporary deflation led to 
high real interest rates, which in turn caused the decapitalization of the 
economy. Such a theory can be constructed from a model used by 
Calvo (1985, 1986) to study anticipated temporary changes in money 
growth. While his original purpose was to study the impact of disinfla 
tion programs in Central and South America, his results can be used 
here as well.
If one accepts that the deflation of 1930-1932 was (at least par 
tially) anticipated but expected to be temporary, then it is possible to 
study the behavior of consumption and capital accumulation using a 
monetary version of Calvo's (1985, 1986) model. When the money 
growth rate declines, depending on whether the ensuing deflation is 
severe enough to cause the nominal interest rate to hit its lower bound, 
two things can happen. 5
If the money growth rate is negative but the opportunity cost of 
money remains positive, then the impact of anticipated temporary 
deflation is straightforward. Consumption jumps up and then declines 
throughout the temporary policy period. At the same time, the capital 
stock falls and then begins to rise slowly. The reason for the transitory 
rise in consumption is that the effective cost of consumption is 
expected to rise in the future. The severity of the consumption and 
investment collapse depends on both the size of the money growth 
decline and the length of time it is in place. The larger the fall in the 
money growth rate, the more severe the collapse. On the other hand, 
increases in the length of time the policy is in place can be either good 
or bad. If the policy were in effect for either zero or infinite time, there 
would be no change in consumption or the capital stock—the model is 
superneutral. This implies that there is some finite value for the time 
that the money growth rate is at its low level that maximizes the fall in 
consumption and the capital stock. The impact is less severe if the pol 
icy is in place for either a longer or shorter time.
In the second case, in which the opportunity cost of holding money 
becomes negative, the consumption and investment declines are poten 
tially much larger. When cash or other government-issued liquid assets 
provide a real rate of return above that available on any physical invest-
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ment, agents will attempt to move their assets into cash. The nature of 
money is completely changed. This simultaneously drives down the 
value of the in-place capital stock and results in negative net invest 
ment. In essence, the economy is decapitalized. The decapitalization 
is accompanied by a decline in consumption. The consequences are 
clearly catastrophic. Not only does the value of the in-place capital 
decline, but the demand for firms' production falls as well. This in turn 
decreases the firms' ability to repay loans, making bank deposits less 
safe. The deterioration of the quality of bank assets drives individuals 
to hold cash.
The main lesson here is clear. We must avoid deflations, even 
expected ones. The fact that the nominal interest rate has a natural lower 
bound means that deflation can lead to increases in real interest rates that 
are extremely damaging. For recent discussions of inflation targeting, 
the message is to be wary of targets that imply a significant chance of 
deflation. It may therefore be dangerous to target zero inflation.
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE DEPRESSION
The Great Depression was a worldwide phenomenon, affecting 
virtually all of the industrialized countries. The pervasiveness of the 
economic collapse has led to a study of the manner in which aggregate 
fluctuations are transmitted across economies. Both financial and 
goods market transactions link the international system. What part did 
each of these play in the global collapse and what are the important les 
sons we have learned about exchange rate systems and international 
trade? The remainder of this short section discusses each of these. I 
begin with a description of the gold standard, followed by a short dis 
cussion of the tariff system.
The Gold Standard
In the last decade we have made great strides in understanding the 
role of the gold standard in the propagation of the Depression. 
Numerous people contributed to this understanding, beginning with 
Choudhri and Kochin (1980) and followed by Hamilton (1988), Temin
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(1989), and Bernanke (1995). But it is Eichengreen (1992) who is 
responsible for consolidating the improvement in our knowledge. 6
The gold standard of the inter-war period was a fixed exchange rate 
system, whereby the central banks in all of the major countries of the 
world stood ready to exchange their currency for gold at a fixed rate. 
The purpose of the system was to stabilize economies through specie 
flows. If one country's economy began to shrink, its aggregate price 
level would begin to fall. At the fixed gold-currency exchange, it 
would then be profitable to import gold into the affected country. This 
would increase the stock of money and provide a stabilizing force.
It is important not to confuse this international institutional 
arrangement with contemporary calls for the institution of a domestic 
gold standard. For one country to adopt a gold standard in isolation 
would be to fix the currency price of gold. The result would be that all 
fluctuations in the relative price of gold, for whatever reason, would 
have to be absorbed by the general price level. For example, if an 
increase in political instability somewhere in the world were to drive 
up the demand for gold, instead of the currency price of gold rising, the 
aggregate price level would have to fall. Needless to say, given the 
fluctuations in the real price of gold since the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods System 25 years ago, this would create incredible instability.
The gold standard of the inter-war period is more correctly 
referred to as a gold-exchange standard, and, as mentioned above, its 
primary purpose was to establish and maintain a system of fixed 
exchange rates. While central banks were required to hold reserves to 
back their monetary base, those reserves could be part monetary gold 
and part foreign exchange. Furthermore, requirements generally stated 
that the central bank need hold only 30 to 40 percent of the value of the 
monetary base as backing. The real problem came with the fact that 
countries losing gold (e.g., because they were running current account 
deficits) had no choice but to contract their money stocks. But coun 
tries gaining reserves could choose whether to sterilize the inflows, 
leaving their money stocks unchanged, or allow their monetary base 
and money stock to grow.
The United States and France were the major surplus countries 
during this period, and so they were beneficiaries of gold inflows. But 
both of these countries sterilized the inflows, forcing the world money 
stock to decline substantially and rapidly. Once again, we come to the
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conclusion that the Federal Reserve's contractionary policy, beginning 
in 1928, is of the utmost importance in understanding the nature of the 
Depression.7
The most persuasive case for the causal role of the gold standard 
comes from Bernanke and James (1991) and Bernanke (1995). They 
show that the depth of the Depression depended critically on when a 
country left the gold standard. Those countries that left earliest, such 
as Great Britain (in 1931), had shallower contractions than the United 
States (1933) and France (1936).
It seems likely that we have learned the most important lesson that 
comes from this experience—namely, that the international transmis 
sion of shocks depends on the exchange rate regime. Fixed exchange 
rates allow transmission of certain types of shocks that are buffered by 
the movements in flexible exchange rates. In particular, in a fixed 
exchange rate system, central bank policy is unable to buffer distur 
bances to the real economy—in effect, one loses control of the size of 
one's money stock. Without coordination of central bank policies 
among central banks, a fixed exchange rate block is not viable.
The European Monetary Union is an obvious response to this. 
European countries have decided to institutionalize fixed exchange 
rates and coordinated policy by actually eliminating both individual 
currencies and autonomous central banks. Such a setup will surely 
eliminate the possibility of the calamitous events of the 1930s.
Tariffs
A commonly held view is that the tariff wars of the 1930s bore sig 
nificant responsibility for the wholesale collapse of economic activity. 
For example, Meltzer (1976) has argued that the Smoot-Hawley tariff, 
instituted in June 1930, was of paramount importance in deepening the 
worldwide depression.
This view has been challenged by Crucini (1994), who notes that 
most import duties were specific, not ad valorem. This means that they 
were stated in fixed dollar amounts per unit of import. As a result, the 
main fluctuations in the real value of the tariffs came not with legis 
lated changes in the tariff rates themselves, but with movements in the 
aggregate price level. Once again, it is the deflation during the 1930s
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that is the villain, raising tariffs by much more than even the Smoot- 
Hawley tariff.
But this point raises the question of the impact of the tariff 
changes. Crucini and Kahn (1996) examine the macroeconomic effect 
of these changes. They note that by raising real tariff rates, contrac 
tionary central bank policy could have a quantitatively important 
impact on output. But while the authors calculate an effect on output 
that is large in comparison with what one might expect, it accounts for 
at most 10 percent of the peak-to-trough decline in output, or some 
thing like a cumulative 3 percent decline.
LESSONS AND REMAINING MYSTERIES
Our collective efforts at understanding the Great Depression have 
yielded a number of important lessons for current policy. These fall 
into two broad categories: lessons for policymakers and lessons about 
the construction of financial institutions. The experience of the 
Depression teaches central bankers both about the dangers of deflation 
and about the proper operation of the lender of last resort.
Whether or not it is anticipated, deflation clearly devastates an 
economy. Extreme aversion to deflation has a number of important 
implications for current policymakers. First and foremost, it suggests 
that setting a target of zero inflation for central bank policy may be 
dangerous. One must assume that, with a competent policymaker in 
control, there is an equal chance that resulting inflation will be above 
or below the targeted level. But if deflation is a bad outcome, there 
should be an extreme aversion to it, and so the initial target level 
should be set above zero. It seems to me that a modest amount of per 
manent inflation is a small price to pay for significantly reducing the 
chances of repeating the catastrophic events of the early 1930s.
The second lesson for central bankers concerns the functioning of 
the lender of last resort for the short-term stabilization of the financial 
system. If the lender of last resort operates effectively, there is abso 
lutely no reason that we should ever again face a systemic collapse of 
the banking system of the type seen in the early 1930s.
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Two episodes in the recent financial history of the United States 
suggest to me that the most important aspects of this lesson have been 
learned. I have in mind the response to the stock market decline of 
October 1987 and the collapse of the savings and loan industry begin 
ning around the same time. A stock market crash puts the entire finan 
cial system at risk for a very short period of time, because some 
individuals are inevitably bankrupted and cannot make payments on 
debts that are due immediately. In October 1987, the Federal 
Reserve's reaction was to offer banks large amounts of discount loans 
to enable them to make loans to securities dealers who faced immedi 
ate liquidity problems. This is exactly what the lender of last resort 
should do, and it worked.
The second success was the fact that the savings and loans collapse 
was neutralized. While the difficulties virtually wiped out the savings 
and loan industry, the financial system continued to function and 
remained sound. The method for containment of the problem was the 
deposit insurance system. Deposits in savings and loans were insured, 
and while the insurance system itself was bankrupted, the insurance 
guarantees were honored by the U.S. government through the issuance 
of Treasury securities. It is clear to me that the ultimate guarantor of 
these transactions was the Federal Reserve, acting again in its capacity 
as lender of last resort.
The lessons for the construction of financial institutions clearly 
overlap those for policy makers. I believe the most important involves 
deposit insurance. While deposit insurance has clear costs in that it 
cuts the link between a bank's depositors and its asset allocation deci 
sions, it has one extremely important benefit. Since the central bank is 
the ultimate guarantor of the insurance system, deposit insurance 
removes any element of discretion about the behavior of policymakers 
during a pending financial collapse. Beyond this, it is clear that regula 
tory structures need to be in place to ensure that market participants 
receive as much information as possible about the riskiness of different 
financial instruments.
Finally, I come to the international lessons. There are two. First, 
there is the failure of the inter-war gold standard. From this we should 
have learned about the difficulty in establishing well-functioning insti 
tutions to maintain fixed exchange rates and the implications of this 
type of system for the international transmission of business cycles.
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While I believe that we have learned the lesson, it has taken quite a 
long time. Second, we have learned that deflation affects international 
trade through its impact on the real value of tariffs. This simple lesson 
is yet another reason to fear deflation.
We have clearly come a long way in our understanding of the 
Depression, but I do not believe we are quite finished. There are still 
some remaining mysteries. I will close by listing two, each of which 
comes from a comparison of the recession of 1920-1922 with the 
Great Depression. First, it is my opinion that our understanding of the 
impact of deflation is not quite complete. The logical difficulty is that 
the earlier period suffered from a more rapid, but nearly as extreme, 
deflation, but the result was a sharp and quick recession. This suggests 
that the duration of the deflation is important. But the debt-deflation 
hypothesis would actually predict that shorter, sharp deflations should 
be worse, not better. Why was there no depression in 1922?
Related to this same point is the apparent change in the nature of 
the wage-setting process between 1920 and 1930. Here the point is 
that real wages seem to have been much less flexible during the 
Depression than immediately following the end of World War I. Why 
was this? Without a full understanding of the reason for the slow 
adjustment of aggregate supply during the Depression, we will not be 
sure that we have learned all that we can.
Notes
I thank Margaret Mary McConnell and Mark Wheeler for comments.
1. This is surely the conclusion that would be drawn by a reader of Galbraith (1954).
2. The increase in borrowing came about despite the increase in the discount rate 
from 4 percent to 7 percent.
3. From December 1929 to June 1933, total assets of Federal Reserve System mem 
ber banks fell steadily from $48.1 billion to $33.0 billion.
4. Examples of these competing theories can be found in the simple IS-LM theory of 
Gordon and Wilcox (1981) and the classical theory in Cecchetti (1988a).
5. This lower bound is difficult to determine. One would expect that it restricts the 
nominal interest rate to be nonnegative. If this were true, the short-term interest 
rates plotted in Figure 4 would lead one to conclude that this is an irrelevant case 
for the 1930-1932 period. But in studying this period, it is important to keep in 
mind the existence of postal savings accounts. These effectively increased the
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nominal interest rate floor for individuals to the legislated 2 percent rate paid by 
the U.S. government.
6. See Bernanke's (1993) review of Eichengreen's book and his February 1995 arti 
cle for concise summaries of Eichengreen's argument.
7. I am leaving out numerous details about the mechanics of the gold-exchange stan 
dard and its impact. For example, the sequence of bank panics led central banks 
to reduce their foreign exchange holdings, forcing them to contract their money 
stocks further.
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